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Abstract 
Four experiments test the impact of power (versus powerlessness) on anchoring 
effects. Anchoring refers to the tendency to assimilate oneÕs judgment to a previously 
considered numeric standard. Based on the notion that power facilitates the activation 
of and reliance on accessible information, we hypothesized that power increases 
numeric anchoring effects on judgment, compared to powerlessness. Across studies, 
we found consistent support for this idea, when testing estimations of factual values 
(Experiments 1 and 2), subjective evaluations (Experiment 3), and negotiation 
behavior (Experiment 4). The findings of Studies 2 to 4 qualify the dominant idea in 
power literature that power reduces conformity to othersÕ opinion. Power increases 
conformity to othersÕ opinion, if such opinion is presented as an anchor and therefore 
processed more automatically. These findings also have important methodological 
implications for power research. They show that differences in stimulus presentation 
can steer observed effects of power in opposite directions.  
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Power Increases Anchoring Effects on Judgment 
When people try to estimate a numeric value, then often they assimilate their 
estimate to any numeric value that they encounter before, even if it is irrelevant 
(Chapman & Johnson, 2002; Epley, 2004; Mussweiler, Englich, & Strack, 2004; 
Mussweiler & Strack, 1999a). In the classic demonstration of this anchoring effect, 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) asked participants to estimate what percentage of 
nations in the United Nations were African. Crucially, participants first estimated 
whether that percentage was more or less than 65% (high anchor) or more or less than 
10% (low anchor). This had a marked effect on the subsequently provided estimates. 
Participants who were presented with the high anchor estimated the percentage of 
African nations to be close to 45%, while those who received the low anchor 
estimated 25%. Such anchoring effects have been observed in a broad array of 
judgmental domains, ranging from real estate prizing (Yukl, 1974), to negotiation 
(Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001), to legal decision making (Englich, Mussweiler, & 
Strack, 2006), and even to estimates of the likelihood of nuclear war (Plous, 1989). 
Power Increases Anchoring 
In the current manuscript, we hypothesize that incidental feelings of power 
increase the strength of anchoring effects, compared to feelings of powerlessness. 
This idea is derived from the notion that anchoring effects are considered to be driven 
by the selective activation of information that is consistent with the anchor value and 
subsequent application of that highly accessibly information in forming oneÕs 
judgment (Chapman & Johnson, 1999; Mussweiler & Strack, 1999b; 2000; Strack & 
Mussweiler, 1997). In other words, anchoring to a high value occurs, because when 
people receive a high anchor, then they selectively activate information that is 
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consistent with that high value and subsequently apply that information in their 
judgment.  
We hypothesize that feelings of power increase anchoring, compared to 
feelings of powerlessness, because power affects both steps in this process, increasing 
both the activation of anchor-consistent information and the degree to which people 
rely on it. We explain both effects below: 
Power Increases Information Activation. First, people who feel powerful 
are more likely to activate information that is consistent with salient information. 
People who feel dependent are instead motivated to engage in controlled processing, 
whereby they try to be as accurate as possible in their judgment by looking for 
inconsistent information (Erber & Fiske, 1984; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987). In contrast, 
people who experience a sense of power instead follow a more automatic process, 
where they are unlikely to test their core assumptions and instead allow their thoughts 
to be influenced by whatever information is available (De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004; 
Fischer, Fischer, Englich, Aydin, & Frey, 2011; Fiske, 1993; Fiske & Dpret, 1996; 
Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). 
Therefore, people who experience a sense of power should be more likely to activate 
information about the target-judgment that is consistent with the anchor. 
Power Increases Information Application. Second, people who feel 
powerful should also be more likely (than those who feel powerless) to apply that 
information in their judgment. Various findings have shown that the powerful are 
more influenced by information that is temporarily more accessible, such as primed 
goals or situational cues (DeMarree, Loersch, Briol, Petty, Payne, & Rucker, 2012; 
Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Guinote, 2008; Guinote, Weick, & Cai, 2012). 
Anchors similarly function as temporarily accessible information that has the 
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potential to automatically guide judgment (Mussweiler & Englich, 2005). Therefore, 
people who experience power should not only be more likely to activate anchor-
consistent information about the target of their judgment, but they should also be 
more likely to rely on that accessible information in reaching their judgment, 
compared to those who feel powerless. 
Summary and Overview of Studies 
In summary, there is ample reason to hypothesize that power increases 
anchoring (compared to powerlessness), because power increases both critical 
components that produce anchoring effects: information activation and application. 
We test this prediction in four studies, in which we orthogonally manipulate power 
(high versus low) and the value of an anchor (high versus low). In all studies, we 
predict an interaction effect, such that the difference in estimates between low- and 
high-anchor conditions should be amplified for high-power (compared to low-power) 
participants. We test this in a broad range of settings, to maximize generalizability.  
Methodological Notes. In all studies, participants were recruited on 
AmazonÕs Mechanical Turk. We set sample size to 200 participants throughout all 
studies, based on the recommendation to have at least 50 respondents per cell 
(Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2013). This provides us with enough power (1Ðβ= 
0.80) to detect a small-to-medium effect of f = .20. Throughout these studies, we 
mention whether we exclude any data, and why. Additionally, we report all 
manipulations and we report all measures. We include a meta-analysis that also 
includes studies with non-significant effects to avoid a file-drawer effect. 
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Experiment 1 Ð Eiffel Tower 
Method 
Participants and design. In return for $0.30, 200 U.S. American respondents 
(81 men, 119 women, mean age 34.6 years) participated in this research. Respondents 
were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions of a 2 (power: high vs. 
low) × 2 (anchor: high vs. low) between-subjects design. 
 Procedure. After signing informed consent forms, participants first completed 
an imagined hierarchical power role manipulation (Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky, 
2010). Participants imagined that they had an important, powerful position or a low-
power, subordinate position. After spending a few moments thinking about that, they 
wrote about how this would be and make them feel, providing at least 200 characters. 
Next, participants estimated the height of the Paris Eiffel Tower (actual height: 1,063 
feet / 324 meters), measured from the base to the top of the broadcast aerial. Before 
doing so, participants first answered whether the Eiffel Tower was higher or lower 
than 2,500 feet (high anchor) or higher or lower than 100 feet (low anchor). These 
values represent the 5th and 95th percentiles, respectively (rounded), in a pilot study (N 
= 100, 46% female, mean age 38.0 years), in which participants freely estimated the 
towerÕs height. After indicating whether they agreed or disagreed with the anchor, 
participants provided their own estimation in feet in an open response box. 
Participants were instructed not to look up the correct number. 
Results 
 Given that participants used an open response box (allowing extreme 
responses), we a priori excluded any response that overestimated the actual height by 
a factor of 10 or more (i.e., more than 10,630 feet), as a likely typo. Two participants 
who estimated the tower to be 100,000 and 12,000 feet (30.4 km and 3.6 km, both > 8 
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SDs from mean) were deleted as extreme outliers. One participant provided the 
correct answer. We retained that response as it may have been simply a good guess 
and deletion did not affect results in any meaningful manner.  
 A 2 (power: high vs. low) × 2 (anchor: high vs. low) ANOVA on participantsÕ 
estimation showed the predicted interaction effect of power and anchor, F(1, 194) = 
4.54, p = .034, η2p = .02, in addition to a main effect of anchor, F(1, 194) = 62.00, p 
< .001, η2p = .24, and a main effect of power, F(1, 194) = 6.49, p = .012,  η
2
p = .03.  
 We interpreted this interaction effect by running two planned t-tests, within 
the high- and low-power conditions. This showed that the anchoring effect 
(operationalized as the difference in means between the high- and low-anchor 
conditions) was 74.1% stronger in the high-power conditions, ΔM = 1303.83 feet, SE 
= 168.51, t(99) = 7.74, p < .0001, CohenÕs d = 1.55, 95% CI = [969.46; 1638.19], 
than in the low-power conditions, ΔM = 748.69 feet, SE = 199.93, t(95) = 3.74, p 
< .001, CohenÕs d = 0.76, 95% CI = [351.77; 1145.61]. See Table 1 for means. 
Experiment 2 Ð Eiffel Tower II 
 Experiment 1 showed that power increases anchoring effects on participantsÕ 
judgment of the height of the Eiffel Tower. To increase generalizability, Experiment 2 
seeks to replicate this but changes the procedure. Rather than presenting the anchor as 
an item that is part of the materials, we now present the anchor as advice that was 
supposedly provided by an earlier participant. 
Method 
Participants and design. In return for $0.30, 199 U.S. American respondents 
(103 men, 96 women, mean age 35.1 years) participated in this research. Respondents 
were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions of a 2 (power: high vs. 
low) × 2 (anchor: high vs. low) between-subjects design.1 
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 Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, except that the 
anchor was now presented as advice that was allegedly provided by an earlier 
participant. In reality, the value of that advice served as our anchor manipulation and 
was either 2,500 feet (high anchor) or 400 feet (low anchor)2.  
Results 
 We followed the same data treatment procedure as in Experiment 1; one 
participant who estimated the tower to be 30,000 feet (9.1 km, > 11 SDs from mean) 
was deleted as an extreme outlier. No participant provided the correct height.  
 A 2 (power: high vs. low) × 2 (anchor: high vs. low) ANOVA on the mean 
estimated height of the Eiffel Tower showed the predicted interaction effect of power 
and anchor, F(1, 194) = 5.76, p = .017, η2p = .03, in addition to a main effect of 
anchor, F(1, 194) = 86.67, p < .001, η2p = .31, and a main effect of power, F(1, 194) = 
6.18, p = .014, η2p = .03. 
 We interpreted this interaction effect by running two planned t-tests. This 
showed that the anchoring effect (operationalized as in Experiment 1) was 69.4% 
stronger in the high-power conditions, ΔM = 1805.0 feet, SE = 273.80, t(92) = 6.59, d 
= 1.35, p < .001, 95% CI = [1261.23; 2348.80], than in the low-power conditions, ΔM 
= 1065.35 feet, SE = 157.27,  t(102) = 6.77, d = 1.33, p < .001, 95% CI = [753.40; 
1377.29]. See Table 1.  
Experiment 3 Ð Subjective Evaluation 
Experiments 1 and 2 show that power increases anchoring effects on 
judgments of factual values. To further generalize our findings, Experiment 3 focuses 
on subjective judgments, by asking participants for their evaluation of the study. 
Given that people can be expected to have a stronger opinion on that, than on the 
height of the Eiffel Tower, this serves as a stronger test of our hypothesis.  
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Method 
 Participants and design. In return for $0.30, 201 U.S. American respondents 
participated in this research (103 men, 98 women, mean age 34.7 years). Respondents 
were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions of a 2 (power: high vs. 
low) × 2 (anchor: high vs. low) between-subjects design.   
 Procedure. After completing the same power manipulation as before, 
participants were asked for their evaluation of the study, in particular the writing-task, 
between 0 (very boring) and 100 (very interesting). Before doing so, they were first 
provided with a bogus evaluation, allegedly provided by an earlier participant. This 
served as the anchor manipulation. Depending on condition, this evaluation was either 
very positive (97) or very negative (3). Next, participants provided their own 
judgment on the same 100-point scale, using a slider measure that was preset to a 
neutral (50) starting position.  
Results 
 A 2 (power: high vs. low) × 2 (anchor: high vs. low) ANOVA on participantsÕ 
own judgment of the task showed the predicted interaction effect of power and anchor, 
F(1, 197) = 4.12, p = .044, η2p = .02, as well as a significant main effect of anchor, 
F(1, 197) = 5.15, p = .024, η2p = .03. The main effect of power was not significant, 
F(1, 197) = 2.11, p = .148.  
 We interpreted this interaction with two planned t-tests. This showed that the 
anchoring effect (operationalized as before) was 18 times stronger in the high-power, 
ΔM = 18.25, SE = 6.13, t(95) = 2.98, p = .004, d = 0.61, 95% CI [6.07; 30.34], than in 
the low-power conditions, where the effect was no longer significant, ΔM = 1.02, SE = 
5.87, t(102) = 0.17, p = .86, d = 0.03, 95% CI [-10.62; 12.67]. See Table 1. 
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Experiment 4 Ð Simulated Negotiation Behavior 
 The previous studies showed the anchoring-amplifying effect of power on 
factual and subjective judgments. In Experiment 4 we test whether it also affects 
behavioral outcomes in a negotiation simulation. 
Method 
 Participants and design. In return for $0.30, 202 U.S. American respondents 
participated in this research (73 men, 121 women, mean age 32.2 years). Respondents 
were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions of a 2 (power: high vs. 
low) × 2 (anchor: high vs. low) between-subjects design. 
 Procedure. After completing the same power manipulation as in prior studies, 
participants played a business simulation. They were hired as freelance external 
consultants and were told to negotiate their hourly consultancy fee. They read that an 
experienced colleague offered to recommend an appropriate opening bid. Depending 
on condition, participants either received the recommendation to open the negotiation 
with a $185 bid (high anchor) or a $15 bid (low anchor). After judging whether they 
thought the recommendation was too low or too high, participants entered their 
opening bid, between $0 and $200, using a slider measure that was preset to a $100 
starting position.  
Results 
 A 2 (power: high vs. low) × 2 (anchor: high vs. low) ANOVA on participantsÕ 
own opening bid showed the predicted interaction effect of power and anchor, F(1, 
198) = 6.30, p = .013, η2p = .03, as well as a significant main effect of anchor, F(1, 
198) = 34.07, p < .0001, η2p = .15, and a significant main effect of power, F(1, 198) = 
4.96, p = .027, η2p = .02.  
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 Again using two planned t-test, we found that the anchoring effect 
(operationalized as in prior studies) was 150.9% times stronger in the high-power 
conditions, ΔM = 71.30, SE = 11.25, t(106) = 6.34, p < .0001, d = 1.24, 95% CI 
[49.00; 93.61], than in the low-power conditions, ΔM = 28.42, SE = 12.98, t(92) = 
2.19, p = .031, d = 0.45, 95% CI [2.65; 54.20]. See Table 1.   
Meta-Analysis 
 We performed a meta-analysis to check for a file-drawer effect (Cumming, 
2014) by combining these four reported studies and five additional unreported studies 
(total N = 2202, 984 men, 1217 women, mean age 35.1 years). Combining all data is 
preferred over a traditional meta-analysis approach if the number of studies is small, 
the studies are similar, and the actual data are available (Steinberg et al., 1997). The 
unreported studies were similar in design, including similarly valued anchors (3 and 
97 on a 100-point scale), but differed in their dependent variable. Specifically, 
Experiment 5 tested the sense of control (Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 
2009), critical interaction: F(1, 396) = 3.81, p = .052, η2p = .01; Experiment 6 tested 
risk-taking when engaging in unprotected sex (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006), critical 
interaction: F(1, 398) = 1.41, p = .236, η2p = .004; and Experiment 7 also tested 
sexual risk-taking, critical interaction: F(1, 196) = 0.20, p = .654, η2p = .001; 
Experiment 8 tested assertiveness in negotiating the prize when buying a new car 
(Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007), critical interaction: F(1, 197) = 0.60, p = .441, 
η
2
p = .003; and Experiment 9 tested immorality (speeding; Lammers, Stapel, & 
Galinsky, 2010), critical interaction: F(1, 197) = 0.03, p = .858, η2p = .000.  
 We performed a 2 (power: high vs. low) × 2 (anchor: high vs. low) ANOVA 
on participantsÕ within-study-standardized responses, across all studies, controlling 
for study number (1 - 9). This showed a significant interaction effect of power and 
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anchor, F(1, 2202) = 11.85, p < .001, η2p = .005, as well as a significant main effect of 
anchor, F(1, 2202) = 211.46, p < .0001, η2p = .089, and a significant main effect of 
power, F(1, 2202) = 4.50, p = .03, η2p = .002. The interaction effect was not qualified 
by an interaction with study, F(1, 2202) = 1.46, p = .17, suggesting it is similar across 
the different studies (and associated dependent variables). We found a medium- to 
large-sized anchoring effect in the high-power conditions, ΔM = 0.73, SE = 0.73, 
t(1087) = 12.72, p < .0001, d = 0.77, 95% CI [0.62; 0.85], and a small- to medium-
sized anchoring effect in the low-power conditions, ΔM = 0.45, SE = 0.57, t(1112) = 
7.83, p < .0001, d = 0.47, 95% CI [0.33; 0.56]. In other words, the anchoring effect 
was on average about 65% larger in the high-power than in the low-power conditions. 
General Discussion 
We predicted that because feelings of power facilitate the activation and 
application of situationally available information, power would increase anchoring 
effects. Four studies showed support for this idea, both on factual judgments (the 
height of the Eiffel Tower), subjective judgments (own evaluations), or behavioral 
outcomes (in a negotiation simulation). A meta-analysis across all studies conducted 
in this line of research shows that the effect remains significant after including non-
significant studies. Compared to low-power conditions, participants in the high-power 
conditions reported an anchoring effect that was on average 65% larger.  
Power and Conformity 
These results are important because they qualify a dominant theme in existing 
power literature, which has repeatedly demonstrated that power reduces the degree to 
which people conform to other peopleÕs opinions. For example, using a design that is 
quite similar to that of Experiment 3 (minus the numeric anchor), Galinsky and 
colleagues demonstrated that power reduces the degree to which participants follow 
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bogus evaluations, ostensibly provided by earlier participants (Galinsky, Magee, 
Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008). Other research demonstrates that power 
reduces the degree to which participants use advice provided by other people (See, 
Morrison, Rothman, & Soll, 2011; Tost, Gino, & Larrick, 2012). In our studies, we 
instead found that power increases the degree to which people respond to information 
provided by the experimenter (Experiment 1), allegedly provided by other participants 
(Experiments 2 and 3), or a colleague in a simulation (Experiment 4).  
This difference in outcomes between earlier and current research can be 
explained by differences in methodology. Earlier research focused on judgments 
where participants have formed and established strong opinions Ð for example, on an 
unambiguously boring study (Galinsky et al., 2008) Ð and then received information 
that runs against their own established opinion. In such cases, feelings of power help 
people to defend their own views and resist pressure to conform to others (Anderson 
& Galinsky, 2006; Fast, Sivanathan, Mayer, & Galinsky, 2012; Magee et al., 2007; 
Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2006; Van Kleef, Oveis, Van der Lwe, 
LuoKogan, Goetz, & Keltner, 2008). In contrast, numeric anchors provide a subtle 
and implicit source of influence that bypasses such motivated processes by Òflying 
below the radarÓ and affecting judgments more automatically (Mussweiler & Englich, 
2005). For reasons that we explained in the Theoretical Introduction, feelings of 
power amplify such automatic processes and thus strengthen anchoring effects. 
Paradoxically, the powerful are less influenced in their judgment by strong pressures, 
but more influenced by weak pressures, compared to the powerless.  
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Limitations 
 One limitation to our research is that (due to the lack of a control condition) it 
is unclear whether these effects are more due to power increasing anchoring effects or 
to powerlessness decreasing anchoring effects. This adds to a prevalent problem in 
power research, that many findings do not include a baseline or control condition, 
given that it is often difficult to do so (Magee & Smith, 2013). The few findings in the 
literature that are relevant to our research and that also include a control or baseline 
condition, offer an inconsistent picture. Some findings support the idea that a positive 
effect of power drives these effects. Feelings of power have been shown to increase 
the activation of stereotypical information (Guinote, Willis, & Martellotta, 2010) and 
the degree to which people apply their ideas (Galinsky et al., 2008)ÐÐboth compared 
to feelings of powerlessness and baseline (with no difference between the two). These 
two effects suggest that power increases (but powerlessness does not decrease) the 
activation and application of anchoring information, respectively. Other findings, 
however, support the idea that a negative effect of powerlessness on anchoring drives 
these effects. For example, being in a dependent or subordinate position increases 
peopleÕs tendency to process information that is inconsistent with expectations (Erber 
& Fiske, 1984; Guinote & Philips, 2010), suggesting that powerlessness may also 
hinder both the activation and application of information. Most likely, the effects 
observed here are driven by a simultaneous positive effect of power and a negative 
effect of powerlessness on anchoring (see also: Guinote & Lammers, 2016).  
 Another limitation is that we did not manipulate the extremity of anchors. A 
priori, there is no reason to expect that the current effects would depend on extremity. 
Earlier research has shown that anchoring effects occur for weak, moderate, and 
extreme anchors (Grau & Bohner, 2014; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). For example, 
POWER INCREASES ANCHORING   15 
Strack and Musssweiler even found anchoring effects when participants were asked 
whether Leonardo DaVinci was born before or after 1952 (actual value: 1452) or 
whether the Elbe is longer or shorter than 25 kilometers (actual value: 1165). Our 
values were less extreme. In any case, it would be interesting to test the interaction 
between power and extremity of anchors. 
A final limitation is that we did not manipulate personal relevance. Across all 
studies, participantsÕ estimates were relatively irrelevantÑthey were not incentivized 
for making a correct estimate, for example. It could be that when judgments are 
highly personally relevant, the effect of power on anchoring reverses, because the 
powerful are known to be able to switch more effectively from peripheral to central 
processing, whenever the situation requires more careful processing of relevant 
information (Guinote, 2007). On the other hand, anchoring effects have also been 
demonstrated for decisions that are highly personally relevant and therefore likely to 
invite central processingÑsuch as real-estate agentsÕ pricing decisions of real estate 
properties (Northcraft & Neale, 1987). This issue waits for further testing. 
Methodological Implications 
These findings may also have important methodological implications. 
Anchoring effects may occur unexpectedly and unplanned, due to differences in the 
measurement of the dependent variable. For example, scale end-points or certain 
elements in the formulation of the dependent variable may work as numeric anchors. 
As the current results show, feelings of power may increase the effects of such aspects 
of measurement and thus potentially obscure the true effects of power. 
One example of this occurred in the low-anchor condition of Experiment 4, 
where we found that high-power participants showed less assertiveness than did low-
power participants. This is a clear example where anchoring obscures the true effect 
POWER INCREASES ANCHORING   16 
of power, given that earlier research has repeatedly found that power increases 
negotiation assertiveness (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Magee et al., 2007). In other 
words, if researchers do not control for these effects, it is possible that any observed 
effect of power is actually due to an amplification of the anchoring effect of numeric 
information, rather than reflecting a true effect of power. One way to avoid this is to 
present differently worded versions of the dependent variable and show that the 
manipulation produces parallel effects on each (Fiedler, 2011).  
Applied Implications 
The current findings suggest that powerful peopleÕs judgments are more 
strongly affected by numeric anchors than those of others. One setting where this may 
be particularly likely is in judicial decision-making. Judges have considerable power 
over defendants and are exposed to anchors, for example in the prosecutorÕs 
sentencing demand. It is possible that judges are more influenced by such effects. 
Indeed, research has demonstrated that anchors can affect sentencing decisions, even 
among judges and other legal experts (Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 2006).  
Conclusion 
People who feel powerful rely more strongly on numeric anchors in their 
subsequent judgment than do people who feel less powerful. This finding qualifies the 
dominant view that feelings of power reduce the degree to which people are affected 
by othersÕ opinion.  
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Table 1. Results of Experiments 1 - 4. Cells show means (with SDs). Feelings of power increase anchoring effects, defined as the absolute 
difference in judgment after receiving a high- or low-anchor value. 
 
Study and DV: 
Power High anchor Low anchor Absolute difference, [95% CI] 
Experiment 1 
Height of Eiffel Tower (ft.) 
High power 2028.75 (999.58) 724.92 (654.93) Δ = 1303.8, [969.5; 1638.2] 
Low power 1419.08 (1103.47) 670.40 (845.93) Δ = 748.7, [351.8; 1145.6] 
     
Experiment 2 
Height of Eiffel Tower (ft.) 
High power 2444.39 (1864.99) 639.38 (341.50) Δ = 1805.0, [1261.2; 2348.8] 
Low power 1691.35 (1071.45) 626.00 (371.68) Δ = 1065.4, [753.4; 1377.3] 
     
Experiment 3  
Evaluation of task (0 Ð 100) 
High power 57.72 (30.02) 39.47 (29.35) Δ = 18.25, [6.07; 30.34] 
Low power 42.93 (29.92) 41.91 (29.32) Δ = 1.02, [-10.62; 12.67] 
     
Experiment 4  
Requested Hourly Fee (US$) 
High power 158.39 (46.34) 87.08 (66.45) Δ = 71.30, [49.00; 93.61] 
Low power 155.98 (56.65) 127.56 (69.17) Δ = 28.42, [2.65; 54.20] 
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Table 2. Results of Experiments 5 Ð 9; non-significant interaction-effects. Cells show means (with SDs) and anchoring effect, defined as the 
absolute difference in judgment after receiving a high- or low-anchor value. 
 
Study and DV: 
Power High anchor Low anchor Absolute difference, [95% CI] 
Experiment 5 
Sense of control (0 Ð 100) 
High power 40.87 (25.11) 21.77 (19.09) Δ = 19.10, [12.83; 25.37] 
Low power 33.57 (24.14) 23.12 (19.39) Δ = 10.45, [4.37; 16.54] 
     
Experiment 6 
Risk-taking (0 Ð 100) 
High power 82.92 (21.92) 70.82 (24.17) Δ = 12.10, [5.72; 18.48] 
Low power 79.66 (24.99) 73.20 (24.24) Δ = 6.46, [-0.42; 13.35] 
     
Experiment 7  
Risk-Taking (0 Ð 100) 
High power 54.63 (25.45) 45.44 (26.17) Δ = 9.20, [-1.21; 19.60] 
Low power 54.92 (28.87) 42.27 (27.60) Δ = 12.65, [1.54; 23.76] 
     
Experiment 8 
Car negotiation (0 Ð 100) 
High power 82.45 (24.83) 73.61 (29.66) Δ = 8.84, [-2.26; 19.94] 
Low power 84.10 (23.71) 69.34 (29.69) Δ = 14.76, [4.33; 25.19] 
     
Experiment 9  
Immorality (0 Ð 100)  
High power 62.15 (32.10) 39.93 (29.48) Δ = 22.21, [9.78; 34.64] 
Low power 63.98 (30.85) 43.33 (30.47) Δ = 20.64, [8.53; 32.77] 
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Notes 
                                                
1
 We also included a third factor (orthogonal to the other two). Specifically, before 
providing their estimate, half of the participants were asked whether the provided 
anchor was too low or too high, while the other half were asked whether the anchor 
was correct or wrong. We expected that the powerful would be more likely to argue 
the anchor to be wrong (following See et al., 2011; Tost et al., 2012) and thus show a 
weaker anchoring effect in that condition. However, this factor did not affect results 
(all main or interaction effects, p > .30). We therefore collapsed across it.  
2
 We changed the value of the low anchor, compared to Experiment 1, because 
despite a careful pilot study, we found that almost all respondents (99%) in the low 
anchor condition of Experiment 1 believed that anchor to be too low.  
